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Neo-institutional theory’s concern with understanding the forces that promote 
structural isomorphism has led to a neglect of the heterogeneity of structures among 
organizations operating within the same institutional framework. To better understand 
such variation, we extend institutional theory by focusing on the link between 
institutional expectations and the interests and strategic choices of influential actors in 
an organization. Using a nationally representative sample of bureaucratic small and 
medium size British enterprises (SMEs), we find evidence that while SMEs’ formal 
structures reflect the influence of the institutional environment, this influence is 
significantly moderated by the interests and concentration of owners’ power. In 
particular, we argue that ownership structure affects owners’ interpretations of the 
institutional environment conducive to either opportunities or constraints. Our results 
show that public firms with concentrated ownerships  (OCOs) respond most strongly 
to institutional pressure to bureaucratize the HR function because complying with such 
pressure is in the owners’ interests; therefore, they use their power to conform to the 
institutional expectations. In contrast, in private OCOs, owners use their power to 
resist institutional pressure; hence the HR function is less bureaucratized in such firms. 
We find that firms with dispersed ownership structure (ODOs) conform also to the 
institutional pressure but only up to a standard level. We discuss the implications of 
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INTRODUCTION 
 "Institutionalization as an outcome places organizational structures and practices 
beyond the reach of interest and politics. By contrast, institutionalization as a process is 
profoundly political and reflects the relative power of organized interests and the actors 
who mobilize around them." (DiMaggio, 1988: p.13)  
An extensive body of research on institutional theory has focused on how organizations 
in a given institutional environment face external pressures to adopt the same legitimated formal 
structure, thus come to resemble each other (Boiral, 2003). In reality, however, perfect 
isomorphism (homogeneity) is rare among organizations. Structural variations among 
organizations are often substantial, even for those residing in the same institutional environment 
(Yeung, Lo & Cheng, 2011). A few recent studies incorporated the influence of internal and 
external contingencies into the institutional framework in order to explain the diverse patterns of 
diffusion (Ansari, Fiss, & Zajac, 2010; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009; Souitaris, Zerbinati & Liu, 2012). 
Studies of such heterogeneity of forms show that organizational policies or practices vary when 
institutional environments and the internal organizational characteristics are misaligned (Ansari 
et al., 2010). The misfit occurs when organizations facing the same institutional pressure 
perceive the social expectations differently; these differences may lead to variations of 
institutionalized arrangements.  
Despite attempts to expand institutional theory to explain heterogeneity, the literature has 
largely neglected the active roles and interest-driven choices of organizational actors (Battilana, 
Leca & Boxenbaum, 2009; Lounsbury, 2008; DiMaggio, 1988).  Institutional theory often 
depicts organizations as “overly passive and conforming” (Oliver, 1991:146). A two-stage 
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diffusion process (e.g., Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Sherer & Lee, 2002) demonstrates that early 
adopters are concerned with technical motivations and later adopters engage to implement 
legitimate structural form.  While this line of research greatly deepens our understanding of the 
influence of social context and norms on organizations’ conforming behaviors, some argue that it 
over-emphasizes the external pressure without sufficient attention to micro, internal-level 
dynamics within organizations (Lounsbury, 2008). Organizational actors’ ability to react to 
institutional pressure by using their resources or positions has been largely ignored  (Fligstein & 
McAdam, 2011). Not only do organizational actors perceive the same institutional pressure 
differently, they also may choose to manipulate, compromise, avoid, or simply ignore 
institutional pressure (Oliver, 1991).  
The concept of active organizational actors has long been discussed (DiMaggio, 1988), 
yet significant developments in theoretical and empirical research have been made only recently. 
Westphal and Zajac (1994) showed that organizations adopt incentive plans in order to placate 
key stakeholders, but failed to implement them, which suggests that organizations are able to 
manipulate practice adoption. Lounsbury (2007) also found that mutual funds in Boston and 
funds in New York adopted different performance measures, which shows that variations result 
from diverse courses of organizational actors coping with competing cultural beliefs. 
Investigating the role of actors does not contradict earlier findings of institutional theory; it 
provides more detailed description of diffusion patterns by moving beyond the shell of likeness 
into the varieties inside1.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 We allude to Swedberg’s (2011) perspective on how to theorize in social sciences. Hughes (1984) initially stated that social 
scientists might look for “likeness inside the shell of variety” (p.503). Turning around the original statement, Swedberg, 
however, recommended that future scholars should pay more attention to “varieties inside the shell of likeness” (Swedberg, 
2011: p. 32). 
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 The current investigation attempts to understand how institutional pressure and internal 
dynamics of organizations influence organizational structure separately and interactively. 
Specifically, we focus on how being publicly held and having concentrated or dispersed 
ownership contribute to variation in organizational bureaucratization. We assume that 
institutional pressures typically propel organizations towards higher levels of bureaucratization, 
that whether the organization is publicly or privately held affects responsiveness to such 
pressures, and that the concentration of ownership affects key actors’ ability to resist or conform 
to such pressures.  In line with these assumptions, we show how owners’ interests and 
institutional pressures interact to produce variations in levels of organizational bureaucratization. 
We chose to examine variations in the degree [Is the footnote complete?]  of bureaucratization in 
the human resource (HR) function because it has historically been a key site of institutional 
pressures in organizations  (Baron, Dobbins and Jennings, 1986; de Kok & Uhlaner, 2001; 
Jacoby, 2004).    
 
VARIATIONS IN THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF HR 
We build our hypotheses on two streams of literature. First, we draw on institutional 
theory to understand how the institutional environment affects organizational structure. Second, 
we borrow Child’s (1972) strategic choice perspective to examine key actors’ influences on 
structural arrangements. Lastly, we attempt to integrate institutional theory and a strategic choice 
perspective to explain variations in the degree to which organizations conform to the institutional 
environment. In this paper, organizational structure or structural arrangement refers to Weber’s 
(1964) notion of bureaucratization defined as the presence of formal structure that accompanies 
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appointed official administrators with technical qualifications and explicit functional role (p.333-
334).  
 
Contextual background: HR as a myth and ceremony in contemporary organizations  
Organizational tasks and activities related to human resource management (HRM) such 
as recruiting, hiring, and dismissing employees are common features of modern organizations in 
most developed economies (Boxall, Prucell & Wright, 2007). After the Second World War, a 
belief that specialists in personnel management would increase organizational efficiency, a belief 
fanned by occupational associations of these specialists, diffused across countries (Boxall et al., 
2007). This myth emphasized the importance of the human resources (HR) function through 
various media (Baron, Dobbin & Jennings, 1986). Business schools spurred publication of 
management journals and established a cognitive basis for the legitimization of HR functions. As 
professional HR networks (e.g. Human Resource Professionals London & District, HR Society) 
thrived, social forces for diffusing HRM practices also increased (Boxall et al., 2007).  
However, empirical evidence does not support the popular belief that a formalized HR 
function is now widely diffused across all organizations. Kauffman (2012) showed that the level 
of formalization in HR practices significantly varies across firms; similarly, we found a 
systematic variation in the extent to which HR function has been bureaucratized across our 
sample organizations. Despite the wide acceptance of the HR department as a legitimate function, 
organizations vary significantly in the degree to which the function is bureaucratized. We expect 
these variations to result from interactive influences of the institutional environment and internal 
dynamics. We hypothesize and test the impact of external and internal forces in order to explain 
the variations in the level of bureaucratization of HR function.  
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Institutional theory and bureaucratization  
Neo-institutional theory, dominant perspectives in organizational studies, holds that 
organizations adopt legitimated components, leading to isomorphism with the institutional 
environment (Zucker, 1987). Neo-institutionalists define institutional environments as “rules and 
requirements to which individual organizations must conform in order to receive legitimacy and 
support" (Scott, 1987:126). Organizations with legitimated components may survive longer by 
gaining resources and avoiding sanctions from external audiences such as regulators or 
stakeholders (Zuckerman, 1999). Based on this notion, organizations elaborate their formal 
structures (thus become more bureaucratized) to adapt to their institutional environment and 
thereby gain legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  
Extant institutional research shows how establishing particular formal structures can 
contribute to organizational legitimacy as symbols of its commitment to such norms and values, 
signaling to both internal members and external audiences (Kamens, 1977; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; Tolbert, 1985). In other words, organizations may use formal structures as tools to 
communicate as these structures encompass socially shared meanings (Kamens, 1977). For 
example, Edelman (1992) found that organizations established various types of formal structures 
to demonstrate conformity to legal norms. In her study, these ranged from the presence of a 
formal rule explicitly forbidding discrimination, to the assignment of job titles involving non-
discrimination, to the creation of separate and independent offices dedicated to enhancing equal 
opportunity. She found that organizations that were more sensitive to their normative 
environments exhibited higher levels of bureaucratization. Welbourne and Andrews (1996) 
found that firms with more elaborate HR functions received higher premiums during an initial 
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public offering (IPO), presumably because potential shareholders perceived this as an indicator 
of competent management, thus as an indicator of future growth.  (See also, Hannon and 
Milkovich, 1996).  
We argue that concerns about institutional expectations—pressures to bureaucratize—are 
much stronger in publicly owned firms because external stakeholders take firms’ formal 
structures into account when they invest (Hannon & Milkovich, 1996). The IPO manual from the 
2010 London Stock Exchange supports our argument: during the IPO admission process every 
firm must submit an account of its qualifications: 
The content of the report contains legitimated practices in the UK, rather than a legal or 
regulatory requirement. While the report is not made publicly available, it will influence 
the contents of the prospectus (London Stock Exchange, 2010).  
The manual explicitly refers to formalized HR functions as "legitimated practices" and 
recommends such practices. Therefore, firms listed on the stock market are likely to have higher 
levels of HR bureaucratization to send stronger signals of compliance with institutional 
expectations (Hannon & Milkovich, 1996; Welbourne & Andrews, 1996). Thus, we hypothesize 
that, 
H1. Public firms will have more bureaucratized HR functions, all else being equal.        
  
Strategic choice and bureaucratization 
A strategic choice perspective emphasizes the active role of leading individuals who have 
power to influence the formal structure of an organization through internal political processes 
(Child, 1972; Child, 1997). These key actors interpret the demands and expectations of the 
external environment, define their interests based on their interpretation, and choose the 
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organizational structure that would suit their interests. Owners are among the most distinctive 
actors influencing organizations (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980; Zorn, 2004). Porter (1990) asserted 
that mostly owners determine company goals, thus owners’ interests are an important factor for 
understanding firms’ behaviors. We explore how the perceptions of dominant shareholders2 
(concentrated ownership) influence organizational structure to serve their interests and examine 
how these differ from firms without dominant decision makers (owners with dispersed 
ownership).  
Assuming that formal structure is a way of controlling organizations, we argue that 
owners’ incentives for controlling their organizations are associated with their ownership 
structure. Ownership structure, or the level of ownership concentration, represents each owner’s 
influence on a given firm. On the one hand, large shareholders have large enough stakes in the 
firm to assure that decisions are under their control. On the other hand, small shareholders do not 
have enough stakes in the firm to bear the costs of involvement in management (Berle & Means, 
1932; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Hence, the desire for control along with power escalates as 
ownership increases. For large stakeholders, such as owners with concentrated ownership 
structure (OCOs), would often prefer maintaining the power to control even if the price of 
controlling leads to a profit loss. For example, research shows that when ownership is 
concentrated, an owner-manager (a manager who also owns the firm) prefers more control of the 
organization and, sometimes even accepts lower profits in exchange for maintaining close 
personal or family control of the organization (Allen & Panian, 1982; Pondy, 1969). This 
appears to be an international phenomenon: Geeraerts (1984) found that owner-managers in the 
Netherlands frequently avoided installing an employee council because they refused to share 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Here, we refer to dominant shareholders as individuals (or groups) who own 50% or more of the total voting power. This person 
(or group) has the right to make final decisions at-will at any time.   
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power with the workers. Majority owners with large stocks are more likely to avoid 
commitments or governance practices that may limit their discretion in deploying the 
organization’s resources (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino & Buchholtz, 2001).   
Bureaucratization could limit the power of owners with concentrated ownership by 
constraining their flexibility in directing others and making or changing decisions (Crozier, 
1964). A system of rationalized rules and specified tasks offers some autonomy and power to 
workers as long as they meet the given set of goals. Blau and Meyer (1971) noted that advancing 
specialization increases the interdependencies between high and low status people, sometimes 
disrupting the power of the former. They found that if expertness and hierarchical authority are 
not identical, specialists who are legitimized by their expertise could threaten the authority of 
their supervisors. Similarly, agency theorists also recognized the loss of control and power that 
occurs when the owner (principal) delegates authority to managers (agents) (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Dyl, 1988). In sum, we expect that owners with concentrated ownership structure (OCOs) 
would prioritize control of their organizations, thereby limiting bureaucratization.   
Dispersed ownership (i.e., no single majority owner) requires formal structure to reduce 
potential uncertainties. Unlike large shareholders, owners with dispersed ownership have weaker 
influence on decision-making because of their weaker voting power (Cubbin & Leech, 1983). In 
this case, owners with considerable shares are apt to exert independent influence in decision-
making by forming coalitions (Bennedsen & Wolfenzon, 2000). Decision-making processes 
become extremely complex due to the diversity of power structure among owners as well as their 
varied interests: unaligned owner and manager interests intensifies complexity (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Roe, 1994). Multiple owners striving to influence organizational 
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structure leads to decision-making instability due to changes of power dynamics. Formal 
structures can manage such variations and increase organizational stability (Meyer, 1975).   
To summarize, owners are likely to design their organizations’ formal structure based on 
their perception of interests. They would desire to either elaborate or limit the degree of 
bureaucratization of an organization based on their power to realize their interests. We argue that 
owners would strongly prefer avoiding losing control over their organizations, thus be motivated 
to maintain their power by limiting the level of bureaucratization in all functions, including HR. 
Concentrated ownership structure enables owners to pursue their interests as they are in full 
control. By contrast, owners in organizations without a single majority owner would prefer to 
elaborate the bureaucratization of the HR function due to uncertainty and complexity of 
decision-making structures.  
H2: Firms with concentrated ownership will have a less bureaucratized HR function than 
those with dispersed ownership, all else being equal.  
  
The dilemma of the bureaucratization: legitimacy or control? 
Neo-institutional theory arguments concerning the legitimizing aspects of 
bureaucratization, and arguments from a strategic choice perspective that emphasize preferences 
for the exercise of power, raise a dilemma for owners: Should they conform to institutional 
pressure for greater bureaucratization to gain legitimacy or resist such pressure in order to 
maintain their discretionary powers? To resolve this, we integrate institutional theory with a 
strategic choice perspective to investigate the interaction between owners’ interests and the 
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pressure from the institutional environment. We argue that owner interests (ownership structure) 
and power moderate the influence of the institutional environment on organizational structure.  
Resting on our previous explanations, the link between the two perspectives relies on 
how owners interpret the environment. To effectively combine these perspectives, we limit our 
focus to responses to the institutional environment. We expect that the extent to which 
organizations conform to institutional pressure depends on the interaction between how sensitive 
the owners are to the institutional pressures and how much control they have over the structure of 
organizations. Figure 1 illustrates four types of interaction.  
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
We previously hypothesized that owners, particularly majority owners, prefer less 
bureaucratized functions in order to maximize their power and control. This would be true for 
private firms with OCOs, whose sensitivity to institutional pressure is relatively low compared 
with publicly held firms because they are not worried about investors’ perceptions; thus the need 
for signaling "legitimacy" is less vital. Moreover, majority owners’ ability to exercise power 
over organizational resources, including HR, is high. Therefore, we argue that privately held 
firms with a concentrated ownership structure will have the lowest level of bureaucratization of 
the HR function among all firms because they have interests in resisting institutional pressure for 
bureaucratization and the ability to act on these interests.  
However, the interests of owners with majority shares in public firms differs from that of 
private firms for whom the benefit of conforming to the social expectations exceeds the interest 
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to maintain control; they are likely to prefer that organizations respond to institutional pressures, 
which increase their shareholdings. Thus, they are inclined to bureaucratize the organization, 
particularly in visible functional areas like HR to stimulate investor interests (Leland & Pyle, 
1977; Meyer, 1979). The concentration of power allows them to push for increased 
bureaucratization and signal compliance.  
Similarly, institutionalists have shown that public firms with dispersed ownership 
structures (ODOs) are also susceptible to institutional pressure. Network studies illustrate why 
these firms might face stronger institutional pressure: Davis and Greve (1997) found that firms 
with dispersed ownership are more vulnerable to institutional pressure because multiple owners 
import forms from their experiences or from observations of others. Since these experiences and 
observations are embedded in the social structure, owners become more exposed to institutional 
pressure. Therefore, ODOs would adopt a bureaucratized function to the extent to which external 
audiences expect.  
Nevertheless, the level of elaboration of formal HR structures in public firms with ODOs 
will not exceed the level of structuring in public firms with OCOs. Although both are vulnerable 
to pressure from institutional environments, dispersed ownership firms conform to only the 
standard level (institutional standard). As noted, these firms have complex interests and power 
structures for making decisions. When decision-making processes are too complex and 
ambiguous, individuals tend to reach consensus at a satisfactory (compromise) level (Cohen, 
March & Olsen, 1972). Similarly, ODOs faced with varied interests and complex dynamics 
conform to the level meeting only the institutional standard. Unlike public firms with majority 
shareholders, these firms do not have a dominant power holder to adjust their formal structure by 
force. Ergo, decision-makers in public firms with ODOs adopt or elaborate their bureaucratic 
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structures at the level of peers; we refer to such behavior as conforming to the standard level of 
institutional expectation. We therefore hypothesize,   
H3a. Among all types of firms, the level of HR bureaucratization will be the highest for 
public firms with concentrated ownership structure.  
H3b. Among all types of firms, the level of HR bureaucratization will be the lowest for 
private firms with concentrated ownership structure.  
To justify our claim that OCOs in public firms attempt to signal compliance to 
audience expectations, we take our analysis one step further by exploring how these firms 
establish higher levels of bureaucratization of the HR function. In general, audiences have 
limited access to firms’ internal information to evaluate the validity of the formal structure. 
For this reason, audiences are likely to estimate firms’ value based on visible features of the 
formal structures. These features could rationalize the value of the organization to outsiders. 
As mentioned, the purpose for OCOs in public firms to adopt high levels of bureaucratized 
HR functioning could be associated with signaling "well-managed" to attract potential 
investors (Hannon & Milkovich, 1996). We thus hypothesize that OCOs in public firms more 
than other types of firms use their power to adopt highly visible HR structures such as 
establishing a formal title for the HR managers in order to signal their value to analysts and 
potential investors. 
H4. Those public firms with a concentrated ownership structure will adopt more signaling 
HR functions. 
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DATA AND METHODS 
The data for this study come from the U.K. Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) 
conducted in 2004 collected by interviewing managers in a nationally representative sample of 
workplaces. Interviews were held at each worksite with the senior manager at the worksite with 
day-to-day responsibility for industrial relations, employee relations, or personnel matters. Of the 
original sample of 3587 organizations, 2295 participated (sixty-four percent) (WERS, 2004).  
For this study, we focus on small and medium sized for-profit enterprises. In large 
organizations, the scale of administrative tasks and complexity of coordination among employees 
limits top-level managers’ ability to resist bureaucratization (Blau & Meyer, 1971; Hall, Johnson 
& Haas, 1967). However, in small organizations, the level of bureaucratization is often optional 
since coordination of and communication among organizational members are less problematic 
(Ang, Cole & Lin, 2000). Moreover, finance research shows that small and medium sized firms 
provide a perfect setting to observe the effect of ownership structure: scholars can observe 
owners who hold all the shares, and extremely dispersed ownership structures (Ang et al., 2000).    
The 2006 U.K. Companies Act defines SMEs as firms with fewer than 250 employees. 
This criterion yielded a set of 723 SMEs representing twelve industries, which we use for the 
analysis. Within our sample, twenty-one percent of the SMEs had gone through an IPO and were 
publicly held. We use listwise deletion for the random missing variables. To ensure the 
representativeness of the dataset, we compare our sample with the population of SMEs reported 
by the U.K. Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR).  
 
Variables 
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 Dependent variables. Bureaucratization entails increasing task specialization, elaborating 
a hierarchy of authority, creating explicit rules, and fostering impersonality (Blau and Meyer, 
1971; Tolbert & Hall, 2009). For the dependent variables in the analysis, we measure the 
structuring of the human resource management function using four items from the survey: two 
dichotomously coded variables (1 if present; 0 otherwise) indicating (1) whether a person with 
the title of human resource manager was present, and (2) whether s/he had formal qualifications 
related to personnel management. We included three-point-scale variables (0 if little; 1 if 
moderate; 2 if much) to rank two managerial attributes????: (1) the amount of time each manager 
spends on human resource management issues, and (2) the level of specialization for each 
manager’s formally assigned job responsibility related to the HRM. Figure 2 shows the range of 
scores: fifty-two percent of our sample scored either 0 or 1 indicating a low level of structuring 
in HR. Eighteen percent of our sampled organizations scored 5 or 6. Overall, our dependent 
variable, the level of structuring in HRM, is skewed to the right; still it varies quite noticeably 
across organizations.  
 Because these variables had very restricted ranges, we use a matrix of polychoric 
correlation coefficients to extract factor loadings via the principal components method (Hwang 
& Powell, 2009). As Table 1 notes, all four variables load strongly on a single general factor 
with an eigenvalue greater than 1.  We use the obtained factor loadings to compute the factor 
score, which we then recalculate as a z-score. Thus our dependent variable represents a 
standardized factor score of the level of structuring of the human resource management function.  
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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----------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
 To test Hypothesis 4, we construct a signaling HR function variable by simply 
decomposing our dependent variable. Here, we refer signaling aspect to what auditors or 
investors consider during the IPO process. Based on the IPO manual, these components include 
whether a person with the formal job title, “human resource manager,” is present (0 if no; 1 if 
yes).  
 Independent variables. The index of ownership concentration is a binary variable asking 
if an individual or family owns at least fifty percent of the firm's shares. Our measure follows 
many previous studies that simply dichotomized ownership structure, characterizing firms as 
having a dispersed ownership structure or a concentrated ownership structure (Demsetz & Lehn, 
1985; McEachern, 1975; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980). Apart from ownership concentration, WERS 
2004 does not provide detailed information on the distribution of shares or the total number of 
shareholders. However, the measure is valid for testing our hypotheses because we compare the 
differences between firms with and without a dominant decision-making owner.     
 Whether a firm has gone through an IPO (initial public offering) and is listed on the stock 
market serves as an index for institutional pressure. Hence, this binary variable distinguishes 
those most strongly influenced by institutional pressure. Given the expectations articulated by 
the London Stock Exchange, we expect that pressure to have a more formally str
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function will be highest among public firms. The combination of the two variables enables us to 
understand how concentrated ownership structure interacts with institutional pressure. 
 Control variables. The size of an organization often strongly affects organizational 
structure, particularly variations in formalization (Child, 1973; Hall, Johnson & Haas, 1967; Hsu, 
Marsh & Mannari, 1983; Kimberly, 1976; Pondy, 1969). We control for size by using the log of 
each firm's total number of employees. Likewise, since older organizations are likely to be more 
formalized, we control for organizational age by taking the logged age based on the years an 
organization has been in operation. Our analyses also include a set of twelve dummy variables to 
control for industry using NSIC codes. We control for managers' perceived financial 
performance as an alternative to actual financial performance to adjust the effect of financial 
slack, which motivates decision-makers to invest in structuring their HR function (Guest, Michie, 
Conway & Sheehan, 2003; Wright, Gardner, Moynihan & Allen, 2005). 
Furthermore, we include a measure of the proportion of flexible contract workers such as 
temporary and outsourced workers in our model since complexity in worker contracts could lead 
to formalization of HRM (Hall et al, 1967). Because some scholars insist that the fit between 
strategy and HR is critical for a firm’s performance (Wright & Snell, 1997) and suggest that a 
firm's strategy determines its level of bureaucratization of the HR function, we include a dummy 
variable indicating whether a firm has a formal strategic plan. (Another way to interpret this 
variable is as a general propensity of an organization to be more formalized.)  We also consider 
the complexity of the organizational structure by including whether a firm has a single or 
multiple products or services (0 if single; 1 if multiple). We also control for firms' value in 
human resources by asking if the organization had ever received an award for investing in its 
employees (0 if no; 1 if yes). Finally, to guard against the possibility that internal needs or the 
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power of union members pressured SMEs to formalize their human resource management, we 
control for the proportion of voluntary turnover and proportion of union members. 
Analysis 
 We examine the association between ownership concentration, institutional pressures 
associated with IPO aspirations, and our human resource management bureaucratization measure 
using ordinary least squares regression (OLS) analysis with White's (1980) correction, which 
deals with heteroskedasticity problems. To check the robustness of our analyses, we also run 
ordered-logit models to confirm our results3. We first estimate the effects of control variables 
and add variables representing each hypothesis: the concentration of ownership, public/private 
control, and their interaction. We then use a logit model to test Hypothesis 4 since the dependent 
variable for this hypothesis is a binary measure. Lastly, we run a two by two factorial ANOVA 
test to compare the differences in the mean level of HR intensity across our two main variables 
of interest: public/private status and concentrated/dispersed ownership.  
 
RESULTS  
 Tables 2 and 3 provide descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analyses: Table 2 
shows the means and standard deviations; Table 3 presents the zero-order correlations. Most of 
the correlation is similar to our expectations. Our measure of size and complexity has positive 
correlation with the level of HR bureaucratization, which corresponds to previous research (Hall 
et al., 1967; Child, 1973; Grinyer & Ardekani, 1981). To confirm that listing on a stock market 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The ordered-logit model for robustness check predicts identical results with our OLS models. The robust model is available 
upon request.  
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and ownership structure are not highly correlated, we also analyze variance inflation factors (VIF) 
to check multicollinearity. 
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3 HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
 Table 4 reports the results of analyses predicting the bureaucratization of the HR function. 
Model 1 shows the effect of the control variables by themselves. Larger organizations—ones that 
report having a formal strategy, and those with higher turnover rates—proxy for critical issues in 
HR, exhibit significantly greater levels of bureaucratization in their HR function. However, the 
organization's interest in HR (rewarded for investing in people) or the proportion of union 
members had no association with the level of bureaucratization. The patterns of association and 
statistical significance of the control variables remain unchanged in subsequent models.   
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
 In Model 2, we examine the influence of firms' public/private status on HR 
bureaucratization. As we hypothesized, public firms are more likely to bureaucratize their HR 
function even after adjusting for the effect of other control variables. This supports Hypothesis 1 
and is consistent with our arguments that the IPO process increases the pressure to conform to 
institutionalized notions of more structured HR arrangements. 
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 In Model 3, we include the measure of concentrated ownership structure. When 
controlling for all other effects, firms with concentrated ownership have lower levels of HR 
bureaucratization than those with dispersed ownership. We anticipated that having concentrated 
ownership would stimulate owners to suppress the bureaucratization of the HR function due to 
their desire to maintain power and status. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is supported. We then conduct 
a robustness check by replacing owner-managers4 (owners who also manage firms) for 
concentrated owners in the regression model because all owners might not be eager for control. 
However, our robust model predicts an identical result since most of the owner-managers overlap 
with our measure of OCOs. Table 6 shows that SMEs with owner-managers have less formalized 
HRM even after adjusting for the effect of control variables.  
 As hypothesized, in Model 4 we find an interaction effect between concentrated 
ownership structure and being publicly held on the level of HR bureaucratization. Hence, 
Hypothesis 3 is supported. To decompose the interaction, we divide our sample into four 
categories based on ownership structure and firm status: private SMEs with dispersed ownership 
structures, private firms with concentrated ownership structures, public SMEs with dispersed 
ownership structures, and public firms with concentrated ownership structures. Omitting private 
firms with a dispersed ownership provides the reference category. In Model 5, the results 
demonstrate that private firms with OCOs are significantly less bureaucratized. On the other 
hand, as expected, public firms with OCOs have a significantly higher degree of 
bureaucratization of the HR function.  Publicly held firms with a dispersed ownership structure 
do not differ significantly in their degree of bureaucratization from privately held ones with 
dispersed owners. Therefore, Hypotheses 3a and 3b are supported.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 WERS 2004 asks whether the owners were actively involved in day-to-day management of the given workplace on a full- time 
basis. 
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Figure 3 summarizes the results of the interaction between institutional environment and 
ownership structure. Consistent with our OLS regression result, we find that the concentrated 
ownership structured firms exposed to the stock market have a 1.25 factor higher score for 
formalized HR function than private SMEs with concentrated ownership (p < .000).   
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
In developing Hypothesis 4, we argue that public firms with concentrated ownership 
structures would make greater use of highly visible aspects of HR bureaucratization for signaling 
purposes. We test this assumption by using the logit model (Table 5). Model 1 in Table 5 
provides a baseline model with only control variables. Model 2 confirms that public firms with 
concentrated ownership structures are significantly more likely to have a HR manager with a 
formal title, supporting our hypothesis. Interestingly, public SMEs with dispersed ownership 
structures and private SMEs with dispersed ownership structures show no significant difference 
in the signaling feature of the HR function.       
 These results imply that majority owners are more sensitive and responsive to pressures 
toward bureaucratization from the institutional environment. This is in sharp contrast to private 
organizations with concentrated ownership where bureaucratization of HR is resisted. Hence, we 
argue that the wide range of variation in HR bureaucratization across SMEs can be explained not 
only by the institutional environment but also by the interests of actors (concentrated owners) in 
the given institutional environment.  
  	   21 
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 & TABLE 6 HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 7 & TABLE 8 HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Using a strategic choice perspective and institutional theory, we argue that the 
elaboration of the HR function of the British SMEs is influenced by institutional expectations 
having to do with the legitimacy of an appropriately managed firm and by the interest of key 
decision makers in maintaining their power and control in the organization. Our statistical results 
point to (1) the HR function acting as a way of signaling "well-managed" to an external audience, 
(2) the resistance of owners wi greater control in privately-held firms to institutional pressure, 
and (3) the enhanced conformity to the institutional environment in publicly held firms where 
ownership is concentrated.  
 Our study shows that owners have two main motivations for either adopting or resisting 
institutional pressure from the environment: legitimacy or control. When firms go public, 
decision-makers use formal structuring – increasing bureaucratization – to signal investors of the 
firm’s legitimacy (Leland & Pyle, 1977). This argument is consistent with the findings of Beatty 
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and Zajac (1994): that a CEO's stock holdings influence investors' decisions as a signal of the 
stability of the firm's current situation. We also argue that having a bureaucratized HR function 
can signal "legitimacy" to potential investors or other stakeholders. But when firms remain 
private, OCOs prefer control to legitimacy.   Some scholars suggest that owners choose to 
maintain control even if this leads to a decrease in productivity (Geeraerts, 1984; Pondy, 1969). 
Thus, we propose that the interaction between institutional environment and OCO choices leads 
to variance in the degree of bureaucratization of the HR function.  
 To further discuss this result, we divide the HR function variable into two categories: (1) 
signaling HR functions, including the job title of the HR manager and whether the manager holds 
any formal qualifications in personnel management or a closely related subject, and (2) 
substantive HR function, which deals with the actual responsibilities and time spent on HR 
issues. Table 7 and Table 8 show that private SMEs with OCOs have lower signaling and 
substantive HR functions than SMEs with a dispersed ownership structure. Public SMEs with 
OCOs, however, have a greater degree of signaling HR function than SMEs with a dispersed 
ownership structure. The result supports our hypothesis that public SMEs' OCOs use their power 
to adopt more signaling HR functions to signal legitimacy and fulfill their interests.   
 Interestingly, as Figure 3 shows, SMEs with dispersed ownership structures have a 
similar level of structuring of the HR function. One possible explanation may be the lack of 
power from dispersed ownership. Since this ownership structure has no dominant actor, the 
actors may adopt an HR function at a satisfactory level rather than at a maximizing level. Power 
conflicts between principals and agents might also explain the moderate level of 
bureaucratization. For example, even if the interest of principals in SMEs with a dispersed 
ownership structure is to implement more elaborated signaling HR practices such as hiring 
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formally qualified managers to signal stronger legitimacy, agents may resist doing so to avoid 
the stronger monitoring that accompanies a rationalized structure. As a consequence, the current 
level of bureaucratization may indicate an equilibrium state in power conflicts between the two 
parties. However, better understanding requires further investigation. Building on the argument 
of actors' power collision, future research may examine the source of decoupling between 
signaling and substantive HR functions (Fiss & Zajac, 2004).     
 Results of the research question, “Why might organizations have somewhat similar but in 
certain ways different formal structures despite strong institutional norms?” make several 
contributions to previous research. First, our study shows the importance of considering the 
elaboration of the formal structure within the institutional framework. In the early days of neo-
institutional theory, Meyer and Rowan (1977) stated that,  
the growth of rationalized institutional structures in society makes formal 
organizations more common and more elaborate. Such institutions are myths 
[that] make formal organizations both easier to create and more necessary. (345)                                     
Although numerous diffusion studies successfully demonstrate how formal structures become 
common, discussion of elaboration has been relatively overlooked. Our study shows that 
elaboration of a formal structure still varies across organizations despite its wide acceptance. We 
argue that elaboration of organizational structure is an ongoing process between strategic choice 
and environmental determinism, not a phenomenon explained by a single theoretical framework 
(Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1985).  
 Second, we expand the scope of institutional theory by including the actor's interests. One 
enduring criticism of institutional theory has been its failure to effectively address the role of 
"agency" (Battilana, Leca & Boxenbaum, 2009; DiMaggio, 1988; Oliver, 1991). This criticism is 
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difficult to resolve since obtaining generalizable data with sufficient internal and external 
information is difficult. Though not perfect, WERS 2004 provides both internal and external 
information to capture the effect of "actors" within an institutional framework. Moreover, 
borrowing from the strategic choice perspective, we define actors as leaders who have the power 
to influence organizational form to suit their own preferences (Child, 1997). Our research 
provides a useful starting point to the definition and the role of agency within institutional theory.          
 Thirdly, we revisit the role of the institutional environment by decomposing it. In general, 
previous neo-institutionalists assume that organizational actors' choices are embedded in a 
homogeneous response to institutional environment (Kennedy & Fiss, 2009). In these studies, 
actors’ choices are rather passive, converging toward what the homogeneous audience of the 
institutional field regards as legitimate, and the formal structure itself is assumed to be irrational 
(Hirsh & Lounsbury, 1997; Oliver 1991). Therefore, neo-institutionalists have attended to 
macrostructures that are not effectively linked to the activities of individuals and organizations 
(Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). We, however, argue that an interpretation of institutional 
environment could be heterogeneous under certain circumstances, and organizations' responses 
are based on the interaction between their institutional environment and the choices of influential 
actors. In short, our research suggests that the institutional environment serves as a menu from 
which influential actors actively choose the best options according to their interests, rather than 
as a simple constraint that pushes actors to implement homogeneous actions (Rao, 1994).  
 Moreover, we show that institutional theory may be widely applicable to SME research. 
As noted, some organizational theorists assume homogeneity among SMEs, such that all SMEs 
are informally organized (de Kok & Uhlaner, 2001). As a result, institutionalists often exclude 
SMEs in their models. However, we discovered that SMEs have various structures shaped by 
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various contextual factors: ownership structure, institutional environment, company size, and 
strategy. Furthermore, SMEs provide unique settings to observe autonomy from the institutional 
environment. In this research, we provide only a partial understanding of SME behavior. 
Therefore, future research should take SMEs into account to generalize and broaden our 
understanding of organizational behavior.       
 Lastly, our research empirically tests the interaction of actors’ voluntarism and 
environmental determinism (Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1985). Previous research on organizational 
adaptation assumed mutual exclusiveness between the two factors affecting organizational 
behavior (Astley & Van de Ven, 1983). Our theoretical framework lies at the heart of leadership 
in administration (Selznick, 1957), explaining how influential actors aptly use their institutional 
environments to legitimate their organizations. Thus, we attempt to empirically bridge the old 
and new institutionalism by assuming that actors strive to achieve their goals within the 
boundary conditions of the institutional environment (Hirsh & Lounsbury, 1997; Selznick, 1996). 
We argue that actors' struggles within the boundary conditions become the source of somewhat 
similar but different forms. We find that public SMEs with a concentrated ownership structure 
tend to have a more formalized HR function to emphasize the legitimacy of the organization to 
the market stakeholders. Here, the interests of OCOs align with the widely accepted structure in 
the field. In contrast, private (non-public) SMEs with concentrated ownership are reluctant to 
adopt a formalized HR function as owners’ interests lean towards control. The power of OCOs 
enables SMEs to either conform to or resist the widely accepted practices more than their peers. 
 Our conclusions presume that a concentrated ownership structure could be efficient in 
terms of adopting innovative practices pervasively if these practices match the interests of an 
influential actor in the organization. For example, our research may explain how Korean firms 
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with a "Chaebol" structure rapidly and intensively implement or copy innovative practices from 
their global competitors. In the future, it would be interesting to compare the practice diffusion 
pattern of Asian (or Western) conglomerates with a "Chaebol" structure and typical Asian (or 
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APPENDIX A. SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
(1) HRM Formalization  
- BTITLE 
Q. What is the title of your job? : 
0) Proprietor/Owner / Other Titled manager 
1) Personnel Manager or Officer/ Human Resource Manager or Officer  
 
- BRELATE 
Q.  Is employment relations your major job responsibility or are you more concerned with other 
matters such as financial management or administration at this workplace? : 
 
0) Other responsibilities, 
1) Equally responsible for employment relations and other responsibilities 
2) Employment relations is major job responsibility, 
 
- BPROPORT 
Q. Approximately what percentage of your time do you spend on employment relations matters? 
 
- BHAVQUAL 
Q.  Do you have any formal qualifications in personnel management or a closely related subject? 
0) No / 1) Yes 
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(2) Controls  
 
STRATEGY 
Q. Is this workplace covered by a formal strategic plan which sets out objectives and how they 
will be achieved? 
0) No / 1) Yes 
AWARD 
Q. Is your organization accredited as an Investor in People? 
0) No / 1) Yes 
KPROSER (Complexity) 
Q. Is the output of this establishment concentrated on one product or service? Or are there 
several different products or services? : 
0) Single product or service / 1) Different products or services 
Kestper1 (Resource) 
Compared with other establishments in the same industry how would you assess your 
workplace's financial performance? 
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APPENDIX B. ADDITIONAL DATA ANALYSES 
(1) Private & Dispersed Ownership SMEs (SME Type=1) 
 Private & Dispersed Ownership SME //  nubpropor 





  0 1 2 Total 
SME 
Type=1 0 309 94 70 473 
 
1 53% 25% 23% 244 
 
Total 438 154 125 717 
      
 
Private & Dispersed Ownership SME //  btitle 





  0 1 Total 
 SME 
Type=1 0 345 128 473 
 
 
1 65% 35% 244 
 
 
Total 503 214 717 
 
      
 
Private & Dispersed Ownership SME //  brelate 





  0 1 2 Total 
SME 
Type=1 0 189 154 130 473 
 
1 36% 26% 38% 244 
 
Total 277 217 223 717 
      
 





  0 1 Total 
 SME 
Type=1 0 328 145 473 
 
 
1 62% 38% 244 
 
 
Total 480 237 717 
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Public & Dispersed Ownership SME //  nubpropor 





  0 1 2 Total 
SME Type=2 0 350 112 89 551 
 
1 53% 25% 22% 166 
 
Total 438 154 125 717 




Public & Dispersed Ownership SME //  btitle 





  0 1 Total 
 SME Type=2 0 399 152 551 
 
 
1 63% 37% 166 
 
 
Total 503 214 717 
 
      
 
 
Public & Dispersed Ownership SME //  brelate 





  0 1 2 Total 
SME Type=2 0 237 161 153 551 
 
1 24% 34% 42% 166 
 
Total 277 217 223 717 
      
 
 
Public & Dispersed Ownership SME // bhavqual 





  0 1 Total 
 SME Type=2 0 381 170 551 
 
 
1 60% 40% 166 
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(3) Private & Concentrated Ownership SMEs (SME Type=3) 
 
 







  0 1 2 Total 
SME Type=3 0 221 103 94 418 
 
1 73% 17% 10% 299 
 
Total 438 154 125 717 
      
 
Private & OCOs SME // btitle 
 





  0 1 Total 
 SME Type=3 0 264 154 418 
 
 
1 80% 20% 299 
 
 
Total 503 214 717 
 
      
 
Private & OCOs SME // brelate 
 





  0 1 2 Total 
SME Type=3 0 128 122 168 418 
 
1 50% 32% 18% 299 
 
Total 277 217 223 717 
      
 
Private & OCOs SME // bhavqual 
 





  0 1 Total 
 SME Type=3 0 254 164 418 
 
 
1 76% 24% 299 
 
 
Total 480 237 717 
 
       (4) Public &  Concentrated Ownership SMEs (SME Type=4) 
 
 
Pubilc & OCOs SME // nubpropor 
 





  0 1 2 Total 
SME Type=4 0 434 153 122 709 
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1 50% 13% 38% 8 
 
Total 438 154 125 717 
      
 
 






  0 1 Total 
 SME Type=4 0 501 208 709 
 
 
1 25% 75% 8 
 
 
Total 503 214 717 
 
      
 
 
Pubilc & OCOs SME // brelate 
 





  0 1 2 Total 
SME Type=4 0 277 214 218 709 
 
1 0% 38% 63% 8 
 
Total 277 217 223 717 
      
 
Pubilc & OCOs SME // bhavqual 
 





  0 1 Total 
 SME Type=4 0 477 232 709 
 
 
1 38% 63% 8 
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3. Summary of the Additional Data Analysis 
(1) Distribution of signaling HR functions across SMEs   
 
(2) Distribution of substantive HR functions across SMEs   
 
 
(Dispersed) (Dispersed) (OCO)  (OCO)  
Private SME Public SME Private SME Public SME 
Low 50.00% 45.18% 64.88% 25.00% 
Medium 27.05% 31.93% 25.75% 12.50% 









The Distribution of Signaling HR Function  
(Dispersed) (Dispersed) (OCO)  (OCO)  
Private SME Public SME Private SME Public SME 
Very Low 33.61% 21.69% 46.49% 0.00% 
Low 17.21% 22.29% 25.75% 25.00% 
Medium 12.30% 20.48% 10.37% 37.50% 
High 17.62% 18.67% 9.70% 0.00% 












The Distribution Substantive HR Function 
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Table 1. Factor solutions for the bureaucratization of the HR function  
 
Factor Solutions for HR Function Bureaucratization (N = 836) 
        Variable      Factor loadings 
   Formal Qualifications for HR 
 
0.6608 
Job Responsibility (HR) 
 
0.8349 
Job Title: HR manager 
 
0.7313 
Time spent in HR work 
(High/ Medium / Low) 
 
                                 0.8077 
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Table 2.  Descriptive statistics 
 
Descriptive Statistics           
Variable Obs    Mean      Std. Dev.      Min    Max 
HR bureaucratization 723 0.045 1.020 -1.028 2.088 
Concentrated ownership 723 0.427 0.495 0 1 
Publicly owned 717 0.243 0.429 0 1 
Size 723 63.042 64.273 5 249 
Logged size 723 3.569 1.135 1.609 5.517 
Age 723 32.415 46.045 0 500 
Logged age 720 2.892 1.072 0 6.215 
Union 673 0.126 0.251 0 1 
Flexible workers 711 0.073 0.188 0 1 
Resignation rate 689 0.161 0.176 0 1 
Award 700 0.366 0.482 0 1 
Strategy 719 0.730 0.444 0 1 
Financial resource 666 3.560 0.823 1 5 
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Table 3.   Correlation table  
 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
        
1 HR bureaucratization 1      
2 Concentrated ownership -0.219* 1     
3 Publicly owned 0.180* -0.425* 1    
4 Logged size 0.369* -0.176* 0.104* 1   
5 Logged age 0.040 -0.152* 0.156* 0.135* 1  
6 Union 0.088* -0.292* 0.272* 0.231* 0.184* 1 
7 Flexible workers 0.001 -0.024 0.054 0.095* -0.112* -0.035 
8 Resignation rate 0.072  0.034 0.020 -0.001 -0.170* -0.211* 
9 Award 0.010* -0.254* 0.300* 0.095*  0.059 0.224* 
10 Strategy 0.242* -0.285* 0.220* 0.233*  0.051 0.181* 
11 Financial resources 0.058 -0.007 0.019 0.007 -0.048 -0.067 
12 Complexity -0.005   0.042 -0.082 -0.021 -0.058  0.044 
        
 
    7 8 9 10 11 12  
        
7 Flexible workers 1      
8 Resignation rate  0.089* 1     
9 Award  0.055  0.052 1    
10 Strategy  0.093*  0.007 0.321* 1   
11 Financial resources  0.011 -0.013 0.135*  0.076 1 
 12 Complexity -0.027  0.010 -0.038 -0.052 -0.042 1 
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Table 4. Results of OLS regression models predicting the bureaucratization of the HR 
function   
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      log_size 0.290*** 0.289*** 0.281*** 0.274*** 0.274*** 
 
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) 
log_age 0.004 -0.007 -0.012 -0.027 -0.027 
 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Union (%) -0.130 -0.189 -0.259 -0.273 -0.273 
 
(0.198) (0.200) (0.206) (0.205) (0.205) 
Flexible workers (%) -0.263 -0.296 -0.289 -0.322 -0.322 
 
(0.149) (0.151) (0.149) (0.145) (0.145) 
Resignation rate (%) 0.514* 0.492* 0.501* 0.484* 0.484* 
 
(0.229) (0.230) (0.226) (0.225) (0.225) 
Award 0.020 -0.028 -0.044 -0.040 -0.040 
(Invest in people) (0.094) (0.094) (0.095) (0.094) (0.094) 
Firm strategy 0.360*** 0.331*** 0.298** 0.293** 0.293** 
 
(0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) 
Financial resource 0.049 0.056 0.057 0.052 0.052 
 
(0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) 
Firms' Complexity 0.023 0.030 0.033 0.043 0.043 
 
(0.089) (0.088) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) 
Publicly owned 
 
0.324** 0.243* 0.146 
 (Listed on the stock market)  
 








   
1.024** 
 
    
(0.290) 
 Dispersed Owners / Private 
     
      Dispersed Owners / Public 
    
0.146 
     
(0.132) 
Concentrated Owners / Private 
    
-0.287** 
     
(0.102) 
Concentrated Owners / Public 
    
0.884* 
     
(0.262) 
Constant -1.579*** -1.584*** -1.392*** -1.263*** -1.263*** 
 
(0.240) (0.243) (0.266) (0.272) (0.272) 
      Observations 546 541 541 541 541 
R-squared 0.184 0.199 0.208 0.219 0.219 
Adj. R-squared 0.153 0.167 0.174 0.185 0.185 
  	   45 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 5. The result of logit analysis for signaling HR function 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
   log_size 0.601*** 0.580*** 
 
(0.133) (0.131) 
log_age 0.024 -0.049 
 
(0.095) (0.110) 
Union (%) -0.656 -1.00** 
 
(0.319) (0.360) 
Flexible workers (%) -0.647 -0.829 
 
(0.599) (0.565) 
Resignation rate (%) 0.432 0.276 
 
(0.401) (0.448) 
Award -0.164 -0.275 
(Invest in people) (0.342) (0.321) 
Firm strategy 0.415 0.276 
 
(0.257) (0.261) 
Financial resource -0.117 -0.129 
 
(0.131) (0.325) 
Firms' complexity -0.204 -0.128 
 
(0.312) (0.264) 
Dispersed Owners / Private 
  















   Constant  -2.950*** -2.280** 
 
(0.766) (0.220) 
   Observations 546 541 
Log pseudo-likelihood -295.09 -284.106 
Wald Chi-squared 228.34 . 
Probability 0.0000 . 
Pseudo R-squared 0.087 0.110 
Standard errors in parentheses (Robust standard error) are clustered by industry 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 6. Results of robust OLS regression model for predicting the relationship between 
owner-managers and the bureaucratization of the HR function   
 
Variables Model  






Union (%) -0.199 
 
(0.200) 
Flexible workers (%) -0.238 
 
(0.147) 




(Invest in people) (0.094) 
Firm strategy 0.301*** 
 
(0.095) 
Financial resources 0.048 
 
(0.046) 








  Observations  546 
R-squared 0.195 
Adj. R-squared 0.163 
   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Private SME  
(Dispersed) 
Public SME  
(Dispersed) 
Private SME  
(OCO) 
Public SME 
 (OCO)  
Low 50.00% 45.18% 64.88% 25.00% 
Medium 27.05% 31.93% 25.75% 12.50% 
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Private SME  
(Dispersed) 
Public SME  
(Dispersed) 
Private SME  
(OCO) 
Public SME 
 (OCO)  
Very Low 33.61% 21.69% 46.49% 0.00% 
Low 17.21% 22.29% 25.75% 25.00% 
Medium 12.30% 20.48% 10.37% 37.50% 
High 17.62% 18.67% 9.70% 0.00% 
















  	   50 

























- Sensitive to institutional  
  pressure 
- High owner power 
- Resistant to institutional  
  pressure 
- High owner power 
- Sensitive to institutional  
  pressure 
- Low owner power 
- Resistant to institutional  
  pressure 
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Figure 2. Frequency distribution of the HR bureaucratization across U.K. SMEs   
 
v Scale items include:  
1) Presence of specified credentials for person performing HR tasks  
2) Presence of formal HR manager job title  
3) The level of specialization of the HR management (High, Medium, Low)   
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